TEXAS GULF SULPHUR REVISITED
By Richard A. Booth
It has been nearly forty years since the Second Circuit handed down its landmark opinion in SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.1 In TGS, the company had found an unusually rich deposit of ores
near Timmins, Ontario. When rumors of the find began to circulate, the company issued a
pessimistic press release while several officers and directors purchased stock and call options.
When the company issued a corrective press release, the price of TGS stock rose dramatically.
TGS was a motherlode of legal issues. It was both a classic false press release securities fraud
case (complete with duty to correct issues arising from rumors originating in the company) and it
was an insider trading case. It even raised intriguing issues about the legality of an insider
accepting stock options while in possession of material nonpublic information. The Second
Circuit found violations of federal securities law – in particular Rule 10b-5 – in each of these
transgressions. Although the Second Circuit did not get the theory right in every respect, the
result would clearly be the same today. It has taken all the years in the meantime to sort out the
details of what constitutes securities fraud and insider trading. Indeed, the process continues.
Nevertheless, securities fraud and insider trading have become well established as independent
causes of action under federal securities law.
TGS may well have been decided differently if it had not involved both a false press release and
insider trading. Standing alone, the false press release might have been excused as a mistake of
business judgment – a good faith effort to quell rumors while gathering facts. Similarly, insider
trading might have been excused in the absence of the false press release because the case would
then have turned on an omission rather than a misrepresentation. To be sure, the culprits in TGS
bought stock from fellow stockholders to whom they owed a fiduciary duty. But no one knew in
1968 that that would matter.2
TGS is utterly silent on one key question: the appropriate remedy in a private civil action.
Because TGS was an SEC enforcement action, it was not necessary for the court to address the
issue. But if the court had done so, there is some chance that it would have concluded that those
who traded on inside information should disgorge their gains to TGS the company – because that
is the statutory remedy for short swing trading specified in Section 16(b). Instead, the courts (and
Congress) have struggled since 1968 to define securities fraud and insider trading and to devise
appropriate remedies for each.
It is my thesis here that the connection between securities fraud and insider trading matters. To
be specific, I argue that a securities fraud class action should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears that insiders have used the occasion to misappropriate stockholder wealth.
(And by misappropriation of stockholder wealth I mean something broader than what constitutes
insider trading under current law.) Moreover, I argue that the appropriate remedy in such a case
is for the culprits to disgorge their ill gotten gains to the issuer. Thus, such actions should be
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characterized as derivative actions rather than as class actions. That in turn carries significant
implications. As derivative actions based on insider gain, such actions could be maintained in
state court as well as federal court, thus avoiding the strictures of SLUSA. Indeed, I suspect that
most such actions would migrate to state court because they would be based primarily on
allegations of breach of fiduciary duty (which is more expansive than insider trading as defined
under federal law) and because state law remedies for breach of fiduciary duty are more
generous than the strict out of pocket rule embodied in federal securities law.
A preliminary word on terminology is in order. Although insider trading is a form of securities
fraud, I use the term securities fraud here to refer to cases in which the subject company has
misled the market in some way (usually by issuing a false press release). Most cases involve the
cover up of negative information that drives down the price of the subject company stock when it
ultimately comes to light. Securities fraud can also involve withholding good news, but that
much less common. Much the same is true about insider trading which may involve nonpublic
information that is either bad news or good news. But in the case of insider trading it is not clear
that one type of case predominates. In any event, for simplicity, the discussion here assumes that
securities fraud and insider trading involve undisclosed bad news and accordingly that the
victims of such fraud are those who buy the stock during the fraud period.
In most cases, securities fraud is litigated as a class action in federal court. Although there are
some examples of actions under state law, it seems fair to say that most of the action is in federal
court. Insider trading is usually the subject of federal criminal prosecution. There were a few
early cases that suggested that state law might provide a remedy. But the law relating to insider
trading varies considerably from state to state.
Although federal jurisdiction over these claims is well established, it is also well recognized that
there are problems with the federal approach. In the case of securities fraud, the subject company
pays the settlement or award. Thus, buyers are made whole at the expense of holders, while those
who sell during the fraud period enjoy a windfall. In the case of insider trading, the culprit must
disgorge his gains and usually pay a penalty of some multiple of his gains. Moreover, he often
goes to jail. Theoretically, investors who traded contemporaneously can recover. But the
recovery is typically miniscule.
It is arguable that both securities fraud and insider trading are victimless offenses. In both cases,
the losers trade voluntarily for their own reasons. The losses they suffer would be suffered by
someone fraud or no fraud. If the bad news had come out earlier when it should have, the stock
would have fallen earlier and a different group of stockholders would have suffered. But the
aggregate loss to the market would presumably have been the same.3
On the one hand, it seems obvious that securities fraud and insider trading are worrisome if not
wrong. The financial world would probably be a better place without such shenanigans. On the
other hand, the remedies we have seem to make little sense in the grander scheme of things.
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This system may make some sense if one thinks of the reasonable investor as one who does his
homework, finds a good stock, and invests his money. It makes some sense in such a world to
protect investors who rely in good faith on the accuracy of publicly available information. It
fosters confidence in the markets. And (as Martha Stewart would say) that is a good thing.
Nevertheless, even in such a world, securities fraud class actions (SFCAs) penalize holders in
order to make buyers whole. And there is no real remedy that benefits investors in a case of
insider trading.
In the real world, however, the vast majority of investors are well diversified. And it is arguable
that those who are not well diversified are irrational. Since securities law is designed to protect
reasonable investors, it follows a fortiori that we need not worry about protecting irrational
investors.4
The key question is what do diversified investors want from the securities laws? Ironically, a
diversified investor is likely to prefer pretty much the polar opposite of what an undiversified
investor would want.5 A diversified investor is not likely to care much about securities fraud
except when it is accompanied by insider trading. In the absence of insider trading, securities
fraud is a zero sum game for an investor who holds a well diversified portfolio and trades from
time to time to keep it balanced. Such an investor is likely to gain as often as he loses from
securities fraud in the absence of insider trading. Indeed, securities fraud litigation constitutes a
dead weight loss for such an investor because the defendant company must bear the expense of
defending itself and because the prospect of an award or settlement will cause the price of the
subject stock to fall more than it otherwise would have fallen. Be that as it may, the fact that
diversified investors suffer no loss in the aggregate from securities fraud (other than loss arising
from the litigation itself) suggests that it may difficult to prove loss causation.6 On the other
hand, such an investor does care about insider trading. Insider trading turns the zero sum game
into a negative sum game. To be sure, the loss to any one investor from insider trading is still
likely to be miniscule. Nevertheless, insider trading stacks the deck ever so slightly against the
diversified investor.7
Think of the market as a pot in a poker game. In the absence of insider trading, every player
faces the same odds. With insider trading, some traders are able to win a bit more often than they
should. Although outsiders may still be winners overall (because on the average stocks increase
in value over time), they will not enjoy their fair share of the gain. Insiders will have extracted
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just a bit more than their fair share. In other words, even though the market pot grows over time,
insider trading will result in slightly more of the gain going to insiders than should get.8 And
returns to outsiders will be slightly lower they should be.
So what would a diversified investor want in the way of protection from the securities laws? The
answer is quite simple. As a group, diversified investors would want insiders to disgorge their illgotten gains back into the pot. Although an individual player might argue that he would have
won but for the cheater and thus should get the pot, a more likely outcome would be a do-over.9
What does this tell us about the law? It tells us that individual recovery makes no sense in the
context of securities fraud and insider trading. Diversified investors care only about the unfair
extraction of wealth from the pot. As long as they win and lose fair and square they have no
complaint. The appropriate remedy is for the company to recover. Individual recovery by class
action makes no sense. That is equivalent to giving the pot to the player with the second best
hand rather than ejecting the cheater and replaying the hand. In short, the appropriate remedy is a
derivative action by the issuer by which the cheaters disgorge their gains back to the company
and make the pot whole once again.
Up to this point, I have used the phrase insider trading somewhat generically. In practice, insider
trading has been difficult to define. Indeed, try as they might neither Congress nor the SEC has
been able to settle on a definition. Rather, as a matter of federal law insider trading is best
defined as using material nonpublic information for purposes of trading securities in violation of
a duty to the source of the information not to use the information for personal gain. Although
there are notable counterexamples, in most cases the source of the information is the issuer
company and the duty runs to the issuer company. (The counter examples are not really relevant
here.)
This definition of insider trading is arguably too narrow from the point of view of a diversified
investor who is worried about playing in a fair game.10 What concerns a diversified investor is
whether insiders take money out of the pot without assuming the same risks as the other players.
To concoct an extreme example, the board of directors of an issuer company could in theory
authorize the CEO to trade on inside information. Presumably, trading on inside information
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under such circumstances would not constitute a breach of duty to the corporation and thus
would not be illegal under federal law. Yet a diversified investor would presumably object
vigorously to any such license to steal from the pot. This suggests that what constitutes insider
trading broadly defined is not necessarily subject to negotiation. Investors are arguably entitled
to rely on some ground rules that individual corporations cannot change – at least not midstream.
Indeed, it seems likely that authorizing the CEO to engage in insider trading at will would be
illegal under state law as a violation of the duty of care because it amounts to a something for
nothing trade. It is worth noting that the duty of care is generally unwaivable. So maybe the
federal common law of insider trading is pretty close to the correct definition after all.
Although the foregoing example may seem a bit farfetched, the current flap over timing and
backdating option grants affords a good real world example of insider diversion of stockholder
wealth that probably does not rise to the level of actionable insider trading. Presumably, a
corporation's board of directors often (perhaps usually) possesses material nonpublic information
at the time it grants options. And in the case of outright backdating, the board of directors knows
that the value of the stock has risen in the meantime. The SEC has been remarkably sanguine
about the backdating of options, seemingly viewing it as a mere administrative detail. The
argument seems to be that since the board of directors has the power to grant options anyway, it
can grant them nunc pro tunc. One member of the SEC has opined that such grants do not
constitute insider trading:
Boards, in the exercise of their business judgment, should use all the information that
they have at hand to make option grant decisions. An insider trading theory falls flat in
this context where there is no counterparty who could be harmed by an options grant. The
counterparty is the corporation -- and thus the shareholders! They are intended to benefit
from the decision. ... In the best exercise of their business judgment, directors might very
well conclude that options should be granted in advance of good news. What better way
to maximize the value that the option recipient attaches to the option?11
In other words, the argument seems to be that because the corporation itself is a party to the trade
and is deemed to know the material nonpublic information at the time it voluntarily grants an
option, there can be no insider trading involved. Aside from the possibility that the CEO and
other high level employees may control what the board of directors knows and may sit idly by
while the board of directors makes a windfall grant (as happened in TGS), it is not at all clear
that public stockholders would approve of such tactics especially if they entail withholding
information from the market that is otherwise ripe for disclosure.
Although timing and backdating does not appear to constitute insider trading under federal law,
such practices may constitute a breach of fiduciary duty under state law. Thus, if securities fraud
is characterized as derivative in nature, it does not matter whether such practices or any other
diversion of stockholder wealth amounts to insider trading or any other recognized form of
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securities fraud. The only question is whether or not the practice is consistent with the reasonable
expectations of stockholders.12
It is important not to get hung up on what constitutes insider trading. The point for present
purposes is that diversified stockholders are likely to care about a broader range of wealth
diversions than simply those that fit the technical definition of insider trading.
Using timing and backdating of options as an example, there are several ways that state law
might address the issues in the context of a derivative action.13 First, such practices may
constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty if the recipients participated in approving the
questionable grant of options. Second, if the issuer company has adopted a stock option plan that
has been ratified by the stockholders (or by the directors in the case of a grant by an authorized
committee or individual), a questionable grant may be challenged as a violation of a rule of the
corporation – essentially a breach of contract – if it is contrary to the terms of the stock option
plan.14 Third, a questionable grant may be challenged as a violation of the duty of care or the
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duty of good faith if the board of directors (or committee or agent thereof) failed to exercise
reasonable business judgment in deciding to grant options at a price lower than fair market value
on the actual date of the grant.15 Finally, such practices may violate the (relatively new) duty of
candor.16 It is crucial for the market to be fully informed for options to work properly. Or if there
has been a violation of SEC rules in connection with the grant, that too may constitute a per se
violation. To be sure, there are elaborate SEC rules requiring extensive disclosures in connection
with options. And the SEC is poised to adopt still more rules relating to backdating and timing.17
But such rules are necessarily reactive and incomplete. Moreover, they are rules and can be
manipulated. This is not to say that such rules do not have value. They do if only to set minimum
standards and to standardize disclosure. But there is an important role here for principles-based
fiduciary duty and the case-by-case approach that it entails.
Although the interests of diversified stockholders and the problems with current federal practice
relating to SFCAs and insider trading are reason enough to scrap the system we have in favor of
a derivative approach, there are several additional arguments that should be noted at least in
passing.
First, diversified investors would be far better off because the collateral damage and litigation
expense associated with SFCAs would be a net savings to the system. Aggregate damages (and
settlements) would be far lower than under current law because they would be limited to insider
gains. Investors in the aggregate would see enhanced returns. On the other hand, an issuer
company would be subject to suit whenever insiders divert stockholder wealth inappropriately
whether or not the company has issued a misleading press release or committed other acts that
constitute securities fraud. The bottom line is smaller awards but more of them. To be sure, a
derivative action would be subject to dismissal by SLC. But the courts are quite able to monitor
that process.18 Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, issuer companies may well be more
willing to police their own if they need not risk the devastation that comes with SFCAs as
currently configured.
Second, SLUSA does not apply to derivative actions and most actions would likely migrate to
state court. Although it is always possible to maintain a derivative action in federal court based
on state law theories (assuming that the requirements of diversity jurisdiction can be met), it
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seems likely that both plaintiffs and defendants will prefer state courts – particularly the
Delaware courts -- for a variety of reasons. An action in the Delaware Court of Chancery will be
heard by a judge who specializes in such matters and who is accustomed to case-by-case
adjudication that amounts to ongoing interpretation of the bargain between corporations and their
managers and stockholders. And that is exactly the issue at stake in deciding whether a particular
practice constitutes an inappropriate diversion of stockholder wealth. Moreover, although the
potential award in a derivative action is much smaller than in an SFCA, the standard remedy in a
breach of fiduciary duty case is rescissory damages rather than mere out of pocket loss.19
On the other hand, one might argue that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction under the
1934 Act and that securities fraud must therefore be litigated in federal court (except for actions
arising under the 1933 Act which is not really relevant here), it is not clear that a derivative
action seeking to recover diverted stockholder wealth from insiders (or a similar direct action by
the corporation) must be characterized as a securities fraud action. Indeed, such an action is just
as reasonably characterized as an action based on an alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Moreover,
a state court may presumably refer to federal law and SEC rules (and whether there has been an
apparent violation thereof) in deciding whether an insider acted reasonably. In other words, state
courts may presumably refer to federal rules as evidence of whether a fiduciary violation has
occurred much as in a case of negligence per se. Thus, federal law and SEC regulations would
likely play a significant role in setting minimum standards – at least for disclosure. (And of
course the SEC would still have enforcement power.) But the state courts would be free to apply
stricter standards in case-by-case litigation under principles-based fiduciary duty law. While it
may seem a bit odd to argue that notoriously vague notions of fiduciary duty are preferable to
more or less bright line rules such as those promulgated by the SEC, fiduciary duty is more
consistent with need to work out the evolving terms of the stockholder contract on an ongoing
basis and that the state courts are better equipped to evaluate the evolving interests of
stockholders. It is perhaps regrettable that fiduciary duty ultimately falls back onto a fairness
standard. But it seems inevitable that it must do so where the ultimate issue is one of how to
divvy up the wealth. In recent years, the courts have tended to shy away from fairness analysis
and to gravitate to stockholder expectations as the norm. To be sure, this is a subtle shift but it
does better capture the essence of what courts of equity do. For example, such an approach
permits a court to consider the implications of stockholder diversification and to tailor
stockholder rights and fiduciary duties accordingly. Here too, recent controversies relating to
option practices provide a good illustration. It seems apparent that some level of timing and
backdating is inevitable and consistent with the good faith administration of an option plan. the
board of directors invariably has better information than public stockholders. Accordingly,
stockholders cannot reasonably expect that options will be granted only in the extraordinary
circumstance that the board of directors is flummoxed about the future. Similarly, it seems
reasonable to grant a new employee options as of the date of hire even though the number of
options may not be determined until some later date. Moreover, such grants may be naturally
regulated if there are other employees who depend on options for a significant portion of their
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compensation. On the other hand, if it appears that the board of directors (or optionees
themselves) manipulated grant dates while in the possession of (disclosable) material facts or
manipulated the books in order (say) to hold back a stock price increase until options could be
granted, the result may be different. In short, a court of equity is well equipped to decide if
options have been granted in a good faith attempt to create incentives to grow the value of the
company as opposed to a scheme to capture past growth. In contrast, federal securities law and
SEC rules are not well suited to a fact-intensive analysis of the situation as a whole and whether
fiduciaries have acted consistently with stockholder expectations.
A closely related question is where does federal securities fraud law really come from? The
simple answer is Rule 10b-5. But Rule 10b-5 simply outlaws fraud in connection with trading in
securities without saying what constitutes fraud. It is arguable that Rule 10b-5 implicitly
incorporates state law (or at least the common law) rather than creating any new law. One might
even say that it merely provides federal jurisdiction for what would otherwise be a state law
cause of action. In any case, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the common law
roots of Rule 10b-5 – particularly in connection with insider trading – and has repeatedly limited
the substantive reach of Rule 10b-5 consistent with the limitations of common law fraud. So it is
somewhat odd that the states should have been forcibly displaced from much of a role in this
area. On the other hand, it is also fairly clear that the federal courts have been much more
expansive in their interpretation of the law of fraud (as it applies in connection with trading in
securities) than the state courts were ever inclined to be.20 And it may well be that that is exactly
what Congress intended. But the most powerful force in the federalization of securities fraud is
undoubtedly the plaintiff bar. The potential award in a SFCA is many times greater than the
potential award in a derivative action. Moreover, once a case has been characterized as one
involving securities fraud and filed in federal court, there is no going back to state court.
Nevertheless, the law of fiduciary duty is fundamentally different from the law of fraud even as
it has been retooled by the federal courts. Despite the fact that the state courts have sometimes
used the word fraud as a synonym for breach fiduciary duty, true fraud depends on deception. To
be sure, fiduciary duty can be satisfied through disclosure. But deception is not a required to
make out a case for breach of fiduciary duty. The courts are free to weigh the equities and in
effect to fill in the blanks in the stockholder contract with the terms that a reasonable investor
would expect.
Third, because state law is likely to comprehend a broader range of offenses than federal insider
trading law, it may be that a derivative approach to securities fraud will obviate the need for the
criminal prosecution of insider trading. It is not entirely clear why issuers do not prosecute
claims of insider trading. After all, the remedy for short swing trading set forth in Section 16(b)
of the 1934 Act is disgorgement of gain (or loss avoided) to the issuer company. Moreover,
Section 16(b) expressly contemplates enforcement by derivative action if the issuer fails to seek
disgorgement. To be sure, actions arising under Section 16(b) are quite rare. But that is because
it is triggered only by a purchase and sale within six months of each other. Although we now
know that there are many other ways to engage in insider trading and that Section 16(b) has
become little more than a trap for the unwary, it seems pretty clear that the framers of the 1934
Act thought that the remedy for insider trading should be disgorgement to the issuer company.
But why is it that issuers seldom seek disgorgement on their own? (It is possible that the practice
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is common but quietly handled. I doubt it.) One obvious reason that issuers do not often sue their
own for insider trading is an inherent conflict of interest. It is often the case that the culprits have
some or much power to decide whether the corporation should sue. Still, that does not explain
why there are few derivative actions in connection with insider trading. On the other hand, it
appears that the number of derivative actions brought in tandem with SFCAs has been increasing
in recent years. Another somewhat less obvious reason for the disinclination of issuers to go after
inside trading is that it might often amount to an admission of the company failed to disclose
material information in a timely fashion and might therefore trigger the filing of an SFCA. Thus,
as I have argued elsewhere, the disproportionate threat of SFCAs and their potentially
devastating collateral consequences may prevent publicly traded companies from self-policing.
That raises another question: Why do we treat insider trading as a crime or civil offense? The
answer is fairly simple. Private remedies do not seem to work. Presumably, a private civil
remedy is always preferable to a criminal prosecution or civil enforcement action. Money
damages are more scalable, whereas criminal sanctions and fines are invariably arbitrary. But
again the problem may be with the plaintiff. A private civil action on behalf of investors is
uneconomic. The amount of damages is likely to be relatively small – probably too small for a
plaintiff firm to bother filing suit. And the amount that any one investor would recover is likely
to be measured in cents rather than dollars. But the amounts involved are not so small that the
issuer – who would get to keep the entire recovery – would decline to sue. Moreover, if issuers
were more vigilant about insider trading, it might not be necessary to prosecute garden variety
insider trading quite so vigorously. Indeed the SEC and DOJ might adopt a policy of nonprosecution in cases in which issuers themselves undertake to self-police. It might still be
necessary to prosecute more exotic forms of insider trading – those that involve defendants other
than conventional corporate insiders – but even in these cases action by the issuer company
would often be a possibility.
Fourth, treating securities fraud as derivative is more consistent with underlying legal theory in
the area. The primary foundation for insider trading is misappropriation of information usually
from the issuer company. If the duty runs to the issuer company, the issuer company should be
the one with standing to sue for disgorgement. On the other hand, one might argue that under the
1933 Act, it is defrauded investors who can sue. Indeed, it may well be that individual recovery
became the rule in SFCAs by some sort of analogy to recovery under the 1933 Act. But the fact
that individual investors recover under the 1933 Act derives from the fact that the company must
disgorge the money it obtained from the fraudulent sale of stock. In other words, in an action
under the 1933 Act the complaint is that the issuer diverted wealth from the aggregate
stockholder pot – the market – and should give it back to the investors who were duped into
parting with it. Moreover, the law is clear under the 1933 Act that damages are limited to the
amount of money the issuer raised. Thus, in contrast to the effective result in SFCAs (where
holders in effect pay buyers), disgorgement by the company in the a 1933 Act setting merely
puts everyone back into the status quo ante. In short, the remedial scheme that we have under the
1933 Act is a powerful argument for treating securities fraud as an action in the name of the
issuer and giving rise to recovery by the issuer rather than as an action in the name of individual
investors giving rise to individual recovery.

The bottom line is that there is much to be gained from viewing most securities fraud actions as
derivative rather than direct. (The exception involves cases in which the issuer company itself is
a party to trading as in actions arising under the 1933 Act and in cases involving repurchases.)
An action in the name of the issuer company – whether prosecuted by the company itself or as a
derivative action – fits the remaining large majority of cases far better than the current system of
SFCAs. Moreover, the collateral benefits are significant. But in order to be as effective as
possible, such actions should proceed under state law and probably in state court. State law can
address a broader range of issues than can federal law. State law can consider issues of fairness
and stockholder expectations. In other words, state law can address the ultimate question of how
to split the pot. In addition, state law can provide a remedy for violations of federal securities law
and rules on the theory that the violation of federal standards is a per se violation of fiduciary
duty. And the remedies available under state law are much more generous to stockholders than
they are under federal law. Theoretically, a federal court applying state law could do all the same
things that a state court could do. But somehow it seems unlikely that a federal court would do
so. Indeed, if the action sounds primarily in fiduciary duty, and matters of federal securities law
are treated as purely evidentiary, it is unclear that the federal courts would have jurisdiction
except in the odd diversity case. To be sure, this proposal stands the current legal regime relating
to securities fraud on its head. But so what. As Professor Marvin Chirelstein once said: "If it's
better, I'm for it."

